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Arab Spring and Its Influence on Lebanese Politics, Culture and Society
Mohammad Ajmal
School of Language Literature and Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
Abstract:
The Arab Spring was a wave of pro-democracy protests and revolutions that swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 and 2011, putting some of the region's established authoritarian governments to the test. Protests in Tunisia and Egypt overthrew their respective governments in quick succession, encouraging other Arab countries to follow suit. However, not every nation found success in the protest movement, as protestors voicing political and economic concerns were sometimes confronted with brutal crackdowns by their own security forces. The Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia), the Egypt Uprising of 2011, the Yemen Uprising of 2011-12, the Libya Revolt of 2011, and the Syrian Civil War for full coverage of the Arab Spring in particular countries as an example. The Arab spring, in other word, Arab uprising, influenced on the entire Arab region though, it directly did not take place in some of the regional countries, such as Lebanon. This study will try to analyze the influence of the Arab Spring on Lebanese Politics, Culture and Society and will highlight the pros and cons of the Arab Spring on Lebanon.
Initiation and Background:
The year 2011 saw the emergence of Arab youth movements, which began in Tunisia and spread to other Arab countries, particularly those with military and security regimes where people have suffered for decades from authoritarian oppression and violations of public and individual liberties.[1] These states lacked peaceful power transfers and did not respect human dignity and rights. These movements had four characteristics: the large number of participants, their diversity, a majority of youth, and their insistence on the peaceful nature of their movement despite the oppression they suffered since the first day. They also shared the same slogans and goals: freedom, dignity, pluralistic democracy, justice, and civil State.[2]
Form the very beginning, these youth and popular movements received deep feedback from the Lebanese youth and its people.[3] This was due to the terrible crises experienced by the Arab societies, for more than four decades, during which there were almost no one in the streets and squares of the cities and the villages. The Arab people were deprived of their right to express their opinion and interests, depression was rampant, and the hope for the future diminished for large groups of people. Oppression was imposed as a substitute for extremism. Internally, organised tyranny and the security state violated Arab and national dignity, as did the states' inability to address invasions, wars, and foreign interventions, as well as widespread oppression in the name of the national cause, and all manner of failures and deals concluded at the expense of the Cause.[4]
This change tackled deep issues related to the culture of the societies and their awareness, concerning identity and belonging, moral questions, the relation between authority and society, between religion and the state, and individual freedoms. It is a progress in the Arab people's standard of living and lifestyle, as well as their dignity and humanity. As a result, it quickly evolved into a fruitful long-term process with profound effects on all levels. It is natural, as in all major change movements, for different social groups in the Arab World, neighbouring countries and their societies, and decision-makers in developed countries to hold opposing views on the current process.
The revolution in the Arab world is considered to be a period of maturity and at the same time a new path, a challenge, and a chance.[5] It is a chance because it places the all-Arab Nations, at the threshold of a new future filled with youth ambitions, to establish political regimes based on the respect of rights and public freedoms, particularly religious freedoms, the protection of human dignity, and the administration of justice and public affairs.
Arab Youth's change is a long-term democratic process that goes much further than having elections that lead in a ruling majority. They are also a culture, enshrining full equality between all citizens, protecting public freedoms, respecting diversity, and the right to difference, and rejecting any monopoly from the part of a majority, whatever its nature.[6]
As it is well acquainted that Syria has strategic partnership with Iran, which produced and fostered the organization of Hezbollah, and has been founded through a mutual agreement to fight Israel; subsequently the re-emergence of Syrian influence in Lebanon through its armed relationship with Hezbollah.[7]
Hezbollah is a complex, multi-layered phenomenon. It is not the Shi'a form of al Qaeda. On one level, it is the manifestation of grassroots empowerment in Lebanon, which explains widespread Shi'ite support for the organization. Hezbollah can also be perceived as an Iranian military and ideological wing of the Iranian revolution in Lebanon. As a result, Hezbollah poses a challenge to Sunni Arab countries as it is a Shi'a authority in the core of the Arab world.[8]
While the rest of the Arab world is largely autocratic, Lebanon is an amazing combination of oligarchy and single party rule. The Berris, Jumblatts, Hariris, Franjiyyahs and Aouns comprise the oligarchy while Hizbullah provides the single party element. With power so diffuse, the removal of one or two of the pillars is hardly going to bring the house down.
Most of the time, the inability on the part of the political actors to think nationally has consigned Lebanon to instability. But in the current regional environment, the very weakness of the centre has protected the country from replicating the regional unrest. The veneer of democratic institutions and norms makes the system difficult to reform. But because checks and balances are exercised by people with vested short-term sectarian interests, these very safeguards serve to perpetuate the power of the oligarchs.[9] Little wonder that Lebanon is one of the few Arab countries unaffected by the Arab Spring. And I think that its people are more interested in the hot Lebanon rather than the spring.
The ongoing revolution and uprising has swept the Middle East, leading to a profound reshaping of the Arab World. These uprisings have had a direct consequence on economic life in the region, as trade has stalled, tourism has slowed, and the economies of the affected countries are stagnating. The Lebanese are skilled at continuing about their daily lives while national and regional happenings simmer or rage. Lebanon is going about its business as usual, without notable crisis or conflict, and with members of the Lebanese Diaspora on the occasional holidays.[10] While the overthrow of dictators in Tunisia and Egypt was widely celebrated, the uprisings in neighbouring Syria inspired a more reserved response.and more uneasy mood.[11]
Lebanon, while officially neutral in Syria, is concerned about the possible consequences of a prolonged civil war or the collapse of the Syrian government in Lebanon. Along with Iran, Syria is the main patron of Hezbollah, so its loss could have far-reaching effects on the balance of power here.[12]
Politically, the climate of uncertainty is expressed in the Lebanese press as well. Newspapers supporting the "March 14" alliance (Sunni, Druze and Christian parties) fear that civil strife in Syria might spill over into Lebanon. They anticipate more tense Sunni-Shia relations, with Christians and Druze caught in the crossfire, and fear that a Hezbollah weakened by the loss of its Syrian backer will feel compelled to act aggressively. Media that favour the "March 8" bloc (Hezbollah and its Christian allies) follow the official Syrian line, blaming the uprisings on foreign intervention and Salafist extremists.[13]
In a large context, "Lebanon has everything to gain from the new political culture in the region." Hezbollah supported the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain, so if Bashar al-Assad falls, it would only have to justify its stance on Syria to its own constituents and adapt to the changing situation.
Several crises over the past ten years could have led to outright conflict in Lebanon, but they didn't. Most people's memories of the 1975-1990 civil war are still fresh, and they are understandably hesitant to return to such a scenario. Lebanon is perhaps "the most stable country in the region" for this reason alone.[14] Lebanon is the sectarian state par excellence, with "an amalgam of religious communities and their myriad sub-divisions, in 2011, however, Lebanon appears to be a relatively stable system, with calm highlighted by successful overthrows in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as forceful challenges to power in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya and unrest in typically quiet Oman.
The Arab Spring calls out to Lebanon through the values of freedom, dignity and justice. It is up to the Lebanese community to respond positively and participate by freeing itself from subordination, polarisation, and the use of force, and reawakening enthusiasm for coexistence and the creation of a free, capable, and democratic Lebanon.
The Arab Spring, it posits, also holds the potential to resolve sectarian tensions through opening “a new horizon for communication and understanding between components of Arab societies, especially between Sunnis and Shiites.”[15]
The consequences of the youth movements on Lebanon and the region, it is necessary to mention that the Christian Arabs were at the forefront of contributors to the Arab renaissance, to the elaboration of Arab identity and belonging, and to the preservation and improvement of the Arabic language. The Arab Spring has destroyed all illegal weapons' ability to shift the balance, finally putting fundamental decisions in the hands of the people rather than an individual or a party, regardless of the pretext for the use of weapons.
The Arab Spring will transform the Arab conflict with Israel from a confrontation with oppressive regimes to one with free people who are not ruled by despots. The common belief in Lebanon is that, freedom is indivisible, and that “those who support freedom for Lebanon and its people cannot continue to support the Syrian regime against its people, who rise for freedom and dignity,” it is an apparent message to Lebanese parties which openly supports the Syrian regime.
The Inter-Islamic Issue:
The Arab Spring opens a new outlook for communication and cooperation among Arab societies, particularly between Sunnis and Shiites, after conflicts reached breaking point in Iraq and the entry of weapons into Beirut in 2008.[16] This tension has two causes: the specificity of the increase in awareness in both parties even if it is for different reasons, and the struggle for power. This upcoming spring encourages the search for new formulas that dissipates tension between them, and their union in a political framework based on citizenship and full partnership in the management of public life.
No one denies the differences on a number of historical and theological concerns, but what they share is far greater. These differences must be limited to the specificity of each sect, which must be respected, and should not be politically exploited, or used for incitement in the media. Arab change must include the right to differ, the freedom to believe, and the appreciation of diversity. These are values that, on the one hand, respect the uniqueness of religious and ethnic groups while, on the other hand, remaining committed to the national frameworks that govern the relationships between groups and social and political life.[17]
In view of the modern socio-political Lebanese experience, the country should not go through a Sunni-Shiite clash, and should stay an example of Islamic and national unity. Clergymen, political leaders, thinkers, and intellectuals in both camps should abide to the goals of unity and be able to stop differences from being clashes. As a result, there is a need for ongoing initiatives and deep dialogue between the two sides at all levels and in all forms in order to foster mutual trust, dispel confusion, defuse chronic or sudden crises, and prevent the mixing of religious-sectarian and political issues.[18]
The Islamic-Christian Issue
Throughout history Muslims and Christians built their culture, civilization and lives together. They co-created their national identity and fought side by side to liberate their Arab nations from foreign occupation. They also had to deal with the consequences of oppression used by unwise authoritarian regimes.[19] It is necessary to mention here that the Arab Christians were at the forefront of contributors to the Arab renaissance, to the elaboration of Arab identity and belonging. Thus, the Christian intellectuals and politicians were, with their Muslim counterparts, pioneers in the emergence of the modern Arab renaissance, and in Arab openness, and in the rise of national states in the Arab Orient. During times of conflict in Lebanon and the region, it appeared that the chasm between Muslims and Christians was too wide to bridge, when in fact it was caused by a variety of external factors unrelated to religion.[20]
Though, deducting political consequences from this is another matter. In modern times, the vast majority of Muslims did not engage in extremism or violence against Christians, nor did they sympathise with extremists. The transformation occurred. It would be unwise to place bets on the dying tyrannical regimes that have caused Christians as well as Muslims to suffer.[21] Furthermore, alliances and projects built on the notion of minority have no future and have nothing to do with Arab Christians, whom Muslims do not regard as a minority in the same way that they do not regard themselves as such. Furthermore, alliances and projects built on the notion of minority have no future and have nothing to do with Arab Christians, whom Muslims do not regard as a minority in the same way that they do not regard themselves as such.They are partners in the culture, belonging and destiny, far from the logic of protection adopted by certain regimes and the effects of which were very negative.[22]
The Arab Issue:
Many people used to talk about "Civilized Arabism," which they favoured and saw as being at odds with Nationalistic Arabism, at odds with Arabism related to religion, and always at odds with Arabism of military and security governments.[23] In this age of revolutions, two notions of renewed Arabism are emerging: civilised Arabism and national Arabism. The current revolutions which share the same titles and slogans: peaceful action, freedom, dignity, democratic state, don’t want ideological or ruling parties. The issue that the revolutionary youth faces is despotism in the name of stability, nationalism, and rejectionism, as well as a loss of national interest, the spread of corruption, the prohibition of freedom of expression, the monopoly of public affairs management, and impunity. As a result, in each country where a youth revolution occurred, there was a strong link between youth actions and democracy. As a result, for the first time, the new Arabism is linked to democracy on the one hand and nationalist revolutionaries on the other.[24]
According to the logic of movements for change, in thought and practice, there is no problem of belonging, but of safeguarding the interests and rights, changing governance, and recognizing the principle of peaceful alternation of power. This is a feat that young people have made to get?? because of the fabricated opposition between the individual, the nationalist, and the patriotic.[25] Arabism, like nationalism, is no longer associated with a theoretical or authoritarian concept, but rather with a common cultural and uniting denominator, rather than exclusivity that differentiates. This new development of nationalism and patriotism can be found in the early campaign launched by media loyal to the Syrian regime against peaceful activists for freedom and dignity, accusing them of being part of a conspiracy against the Nationalist, rejectionist, and resistant regime, as well as the hasty exit from Arabism as a whole due to the Arab League's unanimous rejection of the current Syrian regime's unspeakable violence against its opponents.[26]
The Position Regarding the Syrian Revolution:
The Lebanese Spring waved the banner of freedom, independence and sovereignty. And now, in the midst of Arab movements for change, these slogans have become Arab slogans. However, since the start of the rebellion against the Syrian regime, accusations of conspiracy and treason have been levelled against supporters of independence or those who express solidarity with the Syrian people's uprising against his despotic regime, and this under two pretexts: those who are supportive of the Syrian people are guilty of "conspiring against the Resistance"; the specificity of Lebanese-Syrian relations requires a non-interference in Syrian affairs. Without a doubt, the Syrian people are driving the revolution. Those in Lebanon who truly interfere in Syrian affairs using autocratic methods of the past are those who declare loudly and clearly each day in the media, on the ground, and in all Arab and international forums that they support the Syrian regime against its people, or that they distance themselves from any interference in Syrian affairs![27]
Hezbollah in the wake of the Arab Spring:
Although Lebanon has not encountered the same levels of turmoil as its neighbours, Hezbollah is not immune to the regional instability caused by the Middle Eastern revolutions.[28] Hezbollah is currently the main orchestrator of a new governing coalition in Lebanon, which is riddled with internal divisions. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, created to probe the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, remains a fault-line in Lebanese politics: a debate about the financing of the Tribunal is threatening to reject Lebanon's cabinet entirely. Regionally, the ongoing Syrian revolts are undermining Hezbollah's "strategic depth" and jeopardizing one of its major weapons supply line. While Hezbollah officials have declared that the Assad regime is getting things under control, there is serious concern within Hezbollah's ranks that Syria might be heading toward a state of protracted civil strife.[29]
The Lebanese Shiite group's policy towards the Syrian uprising has been clear: a steadfast commitment to the Syrian regime and a dismissal of the recent protests as an Israeli-American conspiracy.[30] Its stance has been so disappointing for the group's Syrian fans that many protestors carried banners criticizing the Shiite group. This backlash in Syria, the prospect of a regime change, and the progress of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon towards a trial in absentia have put the group in a tight spot.
When the Arab pro-democracy protests erupted in February 2011 in Egypt, Hezbollah applauded them. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said his organization Hezbollah was in “solidarity with the Egyptian and Tunisian people and youth”, stating that “this revolution is the product of the people's will and determination”.[31]
Hezbollah had also praised the Arab Spring democracy movements in Bahrain, Yemen and Libya. But it has no apparent enthusiasm for the uprising in Syria, where tens of thousands of Muslims are demanding democratic reforms and the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. On the contrary, the Militia group has even overseen measures to help Assad crush the demonstrators.
Hezbollah is in a difficult situation. The party supported other Arab revolutions because they shared their resistance ideology that inadvertently put an end to regimes known for their pro-American and Israeli sympathies. However, the situation in Syria is different. Syria for years has allowed weapons from Iran bound for Hezbollah in south Lebanon, on the border with Israel, to transit through its country. Thousands of missiles have made it to Hezbollah this way.
Hezbollah had taken advantage of the upheaval in Syria to obtain advanced weapons systems, such as long-range rockets and Russian-made air-defense systems, according to media reports.
Hezbollah's support for the Assad regime has not gone unnoticed by Syrian protesters. Images from Syria's protests show people burning the yellow Hezbollah flag. Moreover, the Syrian Revolution Coordination Committee has accused Hezbollah of firing rockets from Lebanon into the al-Zabadani region of Syria where anti-Syrian government protests are taking place.[32]
Nonetheless, Hezbollah calls the accusations as ‘rumor’ and baseless. But Shiites here appear to be divided over the matter. The belief of common people in Syria and Tunisia are just the same, fighting against tyrants.
Unrest in Syria is the result of a plot waged against the country and its ally Hezbollah to put an end to their fight against Israel. If the Syrian regime falls, it will be replaced by a Zionist ally, and it will be the end for all. One sees the uprisings as the work of the United States and Israel, and Americans and Israelis want to repeat the Iraqi experience to sow regional discord. Others in the Shiite community are simply pessimistic about the outcome of the Syrian uprising. Some people have no faith that the protests will produce any real change. One dictator will take over for the other.
However, the people of Lebanon warned that Hezbollah must avoid stirring up divisions between the Sunni Muslims leading the uprising in Syria, who are the majority, Violence between Sunnis and Shiites has been tearing apart many Arab nations — Iraq and Bahrain among them.
Hezbollah ought to reconsider its approach and unite Sunnis and Shiites. The solution resides in building a true democracy in Syria. Any other approach will only serve opposite interests.
Hezbollah vis-à-vis the Syrian Uprising:
Another reason for concern is a loss of a strategic ally which for the longest time constituted Hezbollah's primary weapons conduit and provided it with strategic depth.
Furthermore, the group's rhetoric on the resistance has been challenged. By claiming that the current Syrian uprising is meant to oust a regime that has been fighting the US and Israel, Hezbollah has turned against it thousands of protestors who have been fighting for freedom and dignity - and who now are troubled by the group's hypocritical stances. Looking forward at the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, Hezbollah may have to revise its strategy in order to recapture some of the popularity it has lost in recent months. It is not expected, however, to make any large compromises given its loyalty to its Iranian patron.[33]
The end of the Assad regime, whose Alawite sect rules both the government and the military, may set the stage for the state to collapse and a civil war to erupt, turning into a proxy skirmish between regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran. This prospect has alarmed Syria's neighbours, with Iran, Israel, and Turkey expressing concern. Iran fears losing its only Arab ally, which gives Tehran direct access to Hezbollah and Lebanon.
To summarise, the revolutionary wave of protests demonstrates that cosmetic changes are no longer appropriate, and that Syria requires legitimate policy changes that take into account not only recent calls, but also the country's intricacies and ground realities, for the advantage not only of the country, but of the entire area.
Conclusion:
Lebanon has seen and continues to see the politicisation of sectarian identities, which is supported and exploited by the political class. Intervention, whether willingly or unwillingly, by regional and global players strengthens these fracture lines. Both internal and external forces worked together to spark political violence that erupted into a civil war. Political uprisings in Bahrain, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and portions of Saudi Arabia have devolved into violent conflicts with significant ethnic-sectarian and tribal overtones, and Lebanon's uniqueness of sectarian disintegration and violence has faded. The Lebanese Civil War, like many other regional conflicts, may be considered as a forerunner to those hostilities in the region. It started as a political power struggle for socioeconomic change and ended in sectarianism. Another connection is the powerful influence of external actors, who have transformed Lebanon into a staging ground for proxy battles between regional and global powers. During the Cedar Revolution of 2005, the Lebanese people had their “Arab Spring” but many were disillusioned with politicians who professed to react to the people’s progressive aspirations while mismanaging government institutions.
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[1]. Lextington Book: “European Union and the Arab Spring: Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East”, January 2012, p. 8
[2]. Sarah Fayez: العرب وتحديات القرن “Arab and the Challenges of the Century”, Manshurat Ei Kutub, Lebanon 2011, p. 15
[3]. Johny West: “KARAMA! Journeys through the Arab Spring”, Quercus, Aug. 20011, p. 27.
[4]. Jean Pierre Filliu: “The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising”, Oxford University Press, Nov. 2011 p. 44.
[5]. Recardo Alcaro, Miguel Haubrich Seco: “Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprising”, Edizioni Nuova Cultura 2011, p. 21
[6]. James L. Gelvin: “The Arab Uprising: what everyone needs to know”, Oxford University Press Dec. 2011, p. 21
[7]. Council on Foreign Relations: “The New Arab Revolt: What happened, what It means and what comes Next”, March 2011, p. 110
[8]. Augustus Richard Norton: “Hezbollah a Short History”, Princeton University Press 2009, p. 12
[9]. Adel Bechara: “Lebanon: The Politics of Frustration”, Rutledge, 2007 p. 88.
[10]. The Newyork Times, 25 October 2011.
[11]. جريدة النهار اليومية (The al Nahar Newspaper daily), September 13, 2011.
[12]. Al-Manar TV: “an overview of the Arab Spring, Lebanon Response”, January 2012.
[13]. Robert Fisc: “An article published in the As-Safir Newspaper, translated by Admoun Sa’b”, جريدة السفير اليومية (The Daily newspaper As-Safir), December 29, 2011.
[14]. Talal Salman: “Unaffected Lebanon”, جريدة السفير اليومية (The Daily newspaper As-Safir), February 3, 2012.
[15]. The Daily Star, a Lebanese English Newspaper, November 9, 2012.
[16]. Bharat Verma: “Indian Defence Review vol. 26.3, Jul-Sept 2011”, Lancer Publishers 2011, p. 100.
[17]. Alfonso Souza Poza, Hans Groth: “Population Dynamic in Muslim Countries: Assembling the Jigsaw”, Springer, 2011, p. 267
[18] . Johny West: “KARAMA! Journeys through the Arab Spring”, Quercus, Aug. 20011, p. 39.
[19]. Ofra Bengio: “Minorities and the State in the Arab Wordl”, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 62
[20]. Jean Jacques Waardenburg: “Muslim Perceptions of other Religions: A Historical Survey”, Oxford University Press 1999, p. 301
[21]. Hugh Gaddard: “A History of Christian Muslim Relations”, Edinburg University Press, 2000, p. 181
[22]. Mordechai Nesan: “Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and self-Expression”, Mac Farland 2002, p. 275
[23]. Giacomo Luciani: “The Arab State”, University of California Press, 1990, p. 311
[24]. Yusef Mazur: “Zionism, Post-Zionism & the Arab Problem: A compendium of Opinions About the Jewish State”, 2011, p. 102.
[25]. Youssef M. Choueiri: “Arab Nationalism: A history, nation and state in the Arab World”, Blackwell 2000, p. 42.
[26]. Bassam Tibbi: “Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation –State”, McMilan Press Ltd. 1997, p. 45.
[27]. Recardo Alcaro, Miguel Haubrich Seco: “Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprising”, Edizioni Nuova Cultura 2011, p. 55.
[28]. Council on Foreign Relations: “The New Arab Revolt: What happened, what It means and what comes Next”, March 2011, p. 103.
[29]. Jean Pierre Filliu: “The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising”, Oxford University Press, Nov. 2011 p. 81.
[30]. جريدة النهار اليومية (Lebanese Arabic Newspaper), January 27, 2012.
[31]. The Hezbollah Mouthpiece the Al-Manar TV broadcasted in February 2012.
[32]. “The Daily Star” an Eglish Language Newspaper, published from Lebanon, February 2012.
[33]. The Michael J. Totten: “The Road to Fatima Gate: The Beirut Spring and the Rise of Hezbollah”, Encounter Books 2011, p. 24.